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OUT OF AFRICA: TOWARD REGIONAL
SOLUTIONS FOR INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT
INTRODUCTION

A

startling 830,000 people were internally displaced 1 in
2011 as a consequence of the Arab Spring2 uprisings that
transformed the political landscape of the Arab region.3 That
number represents a six-fold increase in displacement 4 from
the previous year. 5 The displaced population rose even more

1. This Note adopts the definition of internally displaced persons (“IDPs”)
used by both the United Nations (“U.N.”) and the African Union (“AU”). According to that definition, IDPs are “persons or groups of persons who have
been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally
recognized State border.” UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT ¶ 2
(2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT],
available at https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Guiding
PrinciplesDispl.pdf. While it is not binding law, this instrument is recognized
to “reflect and [be] consistent with international human rights law and international humanitarian law.” Id. ¶ 3.
2. The term “Arab Spring” is widely used to refer to the popular uprisings
that spread through the Middle East and North Africa beginning in February
2011 with the revolution in Tunisia. See Adrien K. Wing, The “Arab Fall”:
The Future of Women’s Rights, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 445 (2012).
The uprisings have been described as “regional grassroots movements seeking democracy and greater respect for human rights.” Id. at 446; see also
Fouad Ajami, The Arab Spring at One: A Year of Living Dangerously, 91
FOREIGN AFF. 56, 56 (2012) (discussing the Arab Spring more generally).
3. Press Release, Internal Displacement Monitoring Ctr., Conflicts
Worldwide Uproot Millions; Six-Fold Increase in Middle East (Apr. 19, 2012)
[hereinafter Conflicts Worldwide Uproot Millions], available at
http://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/global-overview-pressrelease-2011.pdf. “Arab region” is used here to refer to the area comprised of
“the diverse nations of the Middle East and North African region.” Wing, supra note 2, at 447.
4. This Note uses the definition of displacement generally utilized in related literature, which defines one who is “displaced” as one who has been
involuntarily or forcibly moved from one’s area of habitual residence. See,
e.g., Maria Stavropoulou, The Right Not to Be Displaced, 9 AM. U.J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 689, 690 (1993–94).
5. Conflicts Worldwide Uproot Millions, supra note 3.
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sharply amid ongoing regional conflict during 2012,6 with 2.5
million people newly displaced throughout the Middle East and
North Africa.7 By early 2013, the International Rescue Committee reported that the situation in the Middle East had become “a human displacement tragedy,” with the Syrian Arab
Republic (“Syria”) experiencing the most extreme and ongoing
displacement crisis.8
Indeed, the number of internally displaced persons (“IDPs”)
within Syria has grown dramatically since March 2011, when
civil unrest in the country began. During the course of 2012, as
the conflict escalated into a recognized civil war,9 displacement
in Syria rose over twelve times—from an estimated 200,000
displaced at the beginning of the year10 to a reported 2.5 million displaced by the year’s end.11 By July 2013, more than 4.25

6. Internally Displaced Persons in Syria, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
MONITORING CTR., http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/syria (last
visited Aug. 30, 2013).
7. Internally Displaced Figures, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES
[UNHCR], http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c23.html (last visited Nov. 14,
2013).
8. Press Release, Int’l Rescue Comm., Syria Displacement Crisis Worsens
as Protracted Humanitarian Emergency Looms (Jan. 14, 2013),
http://www.rescue.org/press-releases/syria-displacement-crisis-worsensprotracted-humanitarian-emergency-looms-15091.
9. On July 15, 2012, the International Committee of the Red Cross announced that the conflict had evolved significantly and its scale had reached
such proportions that it could be considered a civil war. Accordingly, “hostilities between these parties wherever they may occur in Syria are subject to
the rules of international humanitarian law.” Syria: ICRC and Syrian Arab
Red Crescent Maintain Aid Effort amid Increased Fighting, INT’L COMM. OF
THE
RED
CROSS
[ICRC]
(July
17,
2012),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/2012/syria-update-201207-17.htm. For more on the influence of this announcement, see Neil
MacFarquhar, Syria Denies Attack on Civilians, in Crisis Seen as Civil War,
(July
15,
2012),
N.Y.
TIMES
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/16/world/middleeast/syria-denies-use-ofheavy-weapons-in-deadly-village-fight.html.
10. Syria: A Full-Scale Displacement and Humanitarian Crisis with No
Solutions in Sight, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CTR. 4 (July 31,
2012),
http://www.internaldisplacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/847
4B2AE5164B7DAC1257A4C004B6634/$file/syria-overview-july2012.pdf
[hereinafter Syria: A Full-Scale Crisis].
11. Internally Displaced Persons in Syria, supra note 6.
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million Syrians, or roughly 20% of the population,12 were displaced within the country.13 Multiple United Nations agencies
were then reporting on the urgent humanitarian needs of Syria’s IDPs,14 and the crisis was dubbed the world’s worst humanitarian emergency.15
Toward the end of 2013, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre was reporting an internal displacement figure upwards of 6 million Syrians,16 a staggering figure amounting to
more than a quarter of the Syrian population.17 With no apparent end to the conflict in sight at the time of writing, 18 displacement was expected to continue to increase19 and the situation for those already displaced was expected to worsen.20
12. The reported population of Syria was 21.9 million at the time of writing. Internally Displaced Persons in Syria, supra note 6.
13. 2013 UNHCR Country Operations Profile—Syrian Arab Republic,
UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486a76.html (last visited Nov. 13,
2013) [hereinafter UNHCR Country Operations Profile—Syria]; see also Mark
Tran, Millions of Syrians in Need of Food as War Devastates Food Produc(July
5,
2013),
tion,
GUARDIAN
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jul/05/syrian-food-aid-war.
Although
this was the latest estimate at the time of writing, it is acknowledged that
“accurate figures on internal displacement are increasingly difficult to ascertain due to government imposed restrictions preventing international agencies from reaching displaced populations” in Syria. Internally Displaced Persons in Syria, supra note 6.
14. In addition to the World Food Programme (“WFP”) and Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N. (“FAO”) (discussed infra note 16), the World
Health Organization reported that Syrian authorities had “increasingly
blocked delivery of medicine and medical supplies around the country . . .
even as health needs [were] escalating for people trapped in two years of conflict.” Hania Mourtada & Nick Cumming-Bruce, State of Siege in Syrian City
Is Blocking Humanitarian Aid, Health Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (July 5,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/06/world/middleeast/syria.html.
15. Tran, supra note 13.
16. Syria: A Full-Scale Crisis, supra note 10.
17. Internally Displaced Persons in Syria, supra note 6.
18. Syria: A Regional Crisis, COMM’N ON SYRIAN REFUGEES, INT’L RESCUE
COMMITTEE
(Jan.
2013),
available
at
http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/resourcefile/IRCReportMidEast20130114.pdf; see also JEREMY M. SHARP &
CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33487, ARMED
CONFLICT IN SYRIA: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 2 (2013), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/195385.pdf.
19. Erin Banco, U.N. Reports Increased Number of Displaced People, N.Y.
TIMES
(June
18,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/world/middleeast/un-reports-increased-
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The Syrian authorities’ response to the displacement crisis
within the country’s borders has been wholly inadequate
throughout the two and a half years of conflict.21 Despite ongoing international recognition of the severity of the displacement
crisis,22 for the first year of the conflict the Syrian government
“refused to acknowledge that the country faced a humanitarian
number-of-displaced-people.html. See also Conflicts Worldwide Uproot Millions, supra note 3.
20. In June 2013, U.N. FAO/WFP reported that “[i]f the present conflict
continues the food security prospects for 2014 could be worse than they are
now.” FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Syrian
Arab Republic, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG./WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME 8 (July 5,
2013), available at http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/faowfpcrop-and-food-security-assessment-mission-syrian-arab-republic. It was also
reported that by the end of 2013, the disaster could likely leave half the country’s population in need of urgent aid. Tran, supra note 13.
21. For instance, in February 2012 the U.N. General Assembly adopted a
resolution condemning the Syrian authorities’ human rights abuses and violent acts against civilians and requesting it cease interference with the delivery of humanitarian aid. G.A. Res. 66/253, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/253 (Feb. 16,
2012). In June 2013, the U.N. Human Rights Council reported that government forces and affiliated militia were continuing to commit war crimes and
crimes against humanity, including the inhumane act of forcible transfer and
the targeting of IDPs. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 23d
Sess., May 27–June 14, 2013, ¶¶ 34–35, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/58 (June 4,
2013). The Syrian “government’s historic inability to tackle displacement
within the country” has been noted in this regard as well. Press Release, Internal Displacement Monitoring Ctr., Internal Displacement Adds Critical
Dimension to the Syria Debate (Aug. 16, 2012), available at
http://www.internaldisplacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/9D
8B8577B60AF792C1257A5D00441674/$file/syria-press-release-aug2012.pdf.
22. Throughout the crisis the international press and prominent international humanitarian organizations have consistently and frequently reported
on the dire conditions and drawn attention to the crisis. For example, in August 2012, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs called
for the protection and assistance of current IDPs and a resolution to the conflict to prevent further displacement. Syria: Severe Internal Displacement
Crisis Due to Disregard for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, U.N.
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Aug. 9, 2012),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=124
25&LangID=E [hereinafter Syria: Severe Internal Displacement Crisis]. This
plea has since been made repeatedly with increasing frequency and force by
U.N. bodies and officials. See, e.g., U.N. Security Council Urges All Sides in
Syrian Crisis to Immediately Provide Access for Humanitarian Aid, UN NEWS
CTR. (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46174
[hereinafter U.N. Security Council Urges All Sides].
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crisis or protection needs.”23 Throughout the unrest, the Syrian
government has consistently failed to fully cooperate with aidgiving organizations and other international actors, stymying
these organizations’ efforts to provide relief to Syria’s IDPs.24
In the absence of a U.N. Security Council (“Security Council”)
decision to intervene,25 the international community’s ability to
23. Syria: A Full-Scale Crisis, supra note 10, at 7.
24. Id. at 10. In June 2013, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance reported that, “despite significant improvements in recent
months, aid delivery continues to face various obstacles due to insecurity,
bureaucratic constraints and insufficient partnerships [with local organizations].” UN OCHA, REVISED SYRIA HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE RESPONSE PLAN
(SHARP)
(Jan.–Dec.
2013),
available
at
http://www.unocha.org/cap/appeals/revised-syria-humanitarian-assistanceresponse-plan-sharp-january-december-2013. In October 2013, the U.N. Security Council, “[g]ravely alarmed, . . . called on Damascus to take immediate
steps to facilitate the expansion of humanitarian relief operations, and lift
bureaucratic impediments and other obstacles. . . . Further, the Council
urged all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, to take all appropriate
steps to facilitate the efforts of the UN, its specialized agencies and all humanitarian actors engaged in relief activities, to provide immediate humanitarian assistance to the affected people in Syria.” U.N. Security Council Urges
All Sides, supra note 22.
25. During the first year of the conflict, it was reported that “[t]he United
Nations Security Council has been unable to agree on any actions other than
issuing weak statements of condemnation.” Neil MacFarquhar, Arab League
Votes to Suspend Syria over Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/world/middleeast/arab-league-votes-tosuspend-syria-over-its-crackdown-on-protesters.html.
This
has
slowly
changed. Following reports of a chemical weapons attack in August 2013, the
Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2118, which “called for the
elimination of the country’s chemical weapons.” UN Security Council Agrees
to Rid Syria of Chemical Weapons, Endorses Peace Process, UN NEWS CTR.
(Sept.
27,
2013),
available
at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46103&Cr=Syria&Cr1=.
The Council, inter alia, “endorse[d] . . . the expeditious destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons programme” and “call[ed] for the convening, as soon as possible, of an international conference on Syria to implement the Geneva Communique.” Security Council Res. 2118, ¶¶ 3, 17, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/2118 (Sept. 27, 2013). The Geneva Communique is a proposed
political settlement to the Syrian conflict, developed and endorsed in June
2013 by “the UN-backed Action Group for Syria . . . [, which] comprised the
UN, Arab League and EU; China, France, Russia, the UK and the US; and
Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar.” The Communique proposes a political settlement to the conflict, with certain conditions. For more, see Q&A: Geneva II
Peace Conference, BBC (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldmiddle-east-24628442. The international peace conference called for in Reso-

358

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 39:1

help displaced Syrians has been limited to humanitarian assistance. 26 Indeed, attempts by international organizations and
U.N. agencies to render humanitarian assistance adequate to
meet the needs of displaced populations have continued to
hinge crucially on the cooperation of Syrian authorities.27 The
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”),
for instance, was able to provide only limited assistance to
IDPs in Syria during 2012 and 2013, with access to crucial areas of the country restricted by the Syrian government.28 Outside states have also been reluctant to intervene.29 Due to all of
lution 2118 to implement the Communique has become known as “Geneva II”
and has faced delay due to noncooperation regarding which parties will attend. Assad’s regime had not confirmed attendance at the time of writing. Id.
However on November 11, 2013, the Opposition voted to
attend peace talks . . . in Geneva if certain conditions were met, including full access for delivery of humanitarian aid and the release of
prisoners. . . . Few say they believe that the Geneva talks will yield a
solution, yet those talks remain the focus of international diplomacy
. . . The United States and Russia had hoped to hold talks by year’s
end, but no date has been set.
Anne Barnard & Hwaida Saad, Leading Syrian Opposition Group, Yielding to
Pressure, Votes to Join Peace Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/12/world/middleeast/syria.html.
26. Pursuant to the U.N. Charter (“Charter”), only the Security Council is
authorized to use force or seek political solutions. Article 42 of the Charter
authorizes the Council to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may
be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” U.N.
Charter art. 42. As of early November 2013, the Security Council had not
voted to make such an intervention.
27. Unless the sovereign state consents, generally, IDPs cannot receive
assistance from international humanitarian organizations. Patrick Schmidt,
The Process and Prospects for the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement to Become Customary International Law, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 483,
489–90 (2004).
28. UNHCR Country Operations Profile—Syria, supra note 13. This aid is
provided “within the framework of the UN Syria Humanitarian Response
Plan and in collaboration with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent.” Id. In April
2013, UNHCR reported having reached a “breaking point” due to lack of
funds to provide assistance to the millions fleeing their homes in Syria. Syrian Refugee Crisis Worsens with Aid Efforts Grossly Underfunded, UN Warns,
NEWS
CTR.
(Apr.
9,
2013),
UN
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44602&Cr=syria&Cr1.
29. “The growing influence of radical Islamist fighters and divisions among
rebel forces have made Western powers reluctant to intervene directly in a
conflict that has killed more than 100,000 people and driven millions from
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these complexities, the protection and assistance needs of Syrian IDPs have remained unmet.30
The state’s inability or unwillingness to protect its displaced,
and the inability or unwillingness of the international community to sufficiently assist,31 is not unique to Syria among instances of armed conflict.32 The dire displacement situation in
Syria therefore presents an opportunity to consider the development of international legal protections that could more effectively assist those displaced due to internal armed conflict. Recent activity of the African Union (“AU”), the leading regional
organization on the African continent, offers an innovative example of one such solution: framing the protection of and assistance to IDPs as a regional responsibility.
On December 6, 2012, the African Union Convention for the
Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (the
“Kampala Convention” or the “Convention”) 33 entered into
force.34 Upon ratification, the Kampala Convention became the
their homes.” Yara Bayoumy, Arab League Backs Syria Peace Talks, Urges
Opposition
to
Go,
REUTERS
(Nov.
4,
2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/04/us-syria-crisis-arabsidUSBRE9A30EQ20131104.
30. Syria: A Full-Scale Crisis, supra note 10.
31. As is the case with Syria, outside states are commonly hesitant to intervene for humanitarian purposes due to complex “geopolitical concerns.”
Roberta Cohen, The International Response to Darfur, FORCED MIGRATION
REV. 23, 8 (2005) [hereinafter Cohen, International Response] (arguing that
the nonintervention in Darfur is typical, as generally “wider interests stymie
humanitarian intervention”).
32. Id. (establishing that the lack of governmental or outside assistance to
IDPs in Darfur is not uncommon to the situation experienced by IDPs displaced through armed conflict elsewhere). Indeed, IDPs commonly remain
inadequately protected by their home state as well as by the international
community. Id. (in the context of Darfur); see also Anne-Christine Eriksson,
Protecting Internally Displaced Persons in Kosovo (Inter-Univ. Comm. on Int’l
Migration, Rosemarie Rogers Working Paper Series No. 3, 1999), available at
http://web.mit.edu/cis/www/migration/pubs/rrwp/3_protectIDPs.html (in the
context of the Kosovo displacement crisis).
33. African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa [Kampala Convention], opened for signature Oct. 22, 2009 (entered into force Dec. 6, 2012), available at
http://au.int/en/content/african-union-convention-protection-and-assistanceinternally-displaced-persons-africa.
34. The fifteenth state to ratify was Swaziland—joining Benin, Burkina
Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Gambia, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Zambia—to bring the Conven-
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world’s first legally-binding instrument35 to define the responsibilities of states toward IDPs.36 The Convention establishes
active involvement on the part of the AU and reflects a general
conception of internal displacement as a regional problem requiring the cooperation of myriad regional actors. The Convention in this way envisions a solution to the common situation of
a state’s inability or unwillingness to independently meet the
needs of its IDPs that calls on the involvement of neighboring
states parties, local civil society organizations, and the AU itself.37 The AU has been widely hailed for this development.38
This Note argues that the Kampala Convention could serve
as a template for the League of Arab States (the “Arab League”
or the “League”)39 to adopt a regional solution to internal distion into force pursuant to the procedures established in the Convention. See
Africa Takes the Lead! World’s First Continental Treaty to Protect Those
Forced to Flee Comes into Force, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CTR.
(Dec.
6,
2012),
http://www.internaldisplacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/E20670B6C7BFA0E7C1257AC
B0062F15B/$file/kc-press-release-en.pdf [hereinafter Africa Takes the Lead];
Kampala Convention, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CTR.,
http://www.internal-displacement.org/kampala-convention [hereinafter Kampala Convention, IDMC]; Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 17(1).
35. In 2008, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States
passed a resolution encouraging states to enhance protection efforts for IDPs.
While this is a development deserving of accolades, it is important to note in
this context that the language of the resolution is normative. The Assembly
“urge[d] member states to consider using the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement, prepared by the Special Representative of the United Nations
Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, as a basis for their plans,
policies, and programs in support of such persons.” Organization of American
States [OAS], G.A. Res. 2417, OAS Doc. AG/RES. 2417 (XXXVIII-O/08) (June
3, 2008).
36. Africa Takes the Lead, supra note 34.
37. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 8.
38. See, e.g., Anna Taylor, Matthew Lopas & Sarone Solomon, Updates
from the Regional Human Rights Systems, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 47, 47–48
(2011); Allehone Mulugeta Abebe, The African Union Convention on Internally Displaced Persons: Its Codification, Background, Scope, and Enforcement
Challenges, REFUGEE SURVEY Q., Sept. 2010, at 28; Andrew Solomon, Introductory Note to African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of
Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, 49 I.L.M. 83, 84 (2010).
39. The Arab League has been chosen for this example as it is considered
the most prominent regional organization in the Arab region. See Marco Pinfari, Nothing but Failure?: The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council as Mediators in Middle Eastern Conflicts, (Crisis States Research Ctr.,
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placement for instances in which reliance on national resources
or international intervention leaves IDPs insufficiently protected or provided for, as is currently the situation in Syria.40 It
is argued that the Arab League should employ a similar approach to that taken by the AU and create a convention that
frames internal displacement as a regional problem with a regional solution. Such an approach may prevent future largescale displacement crises and, absent prevention, better protect
and assist those who do become displaced.
Part I of this Note provides background on the current legal
framework applicable to IDPs and examines the implications of
a regional solution to the problem of internal displacement.
Part II explores the regional conditions, provisions, and limitations of the Kampala Convention. Part III considers transferring the AU’s approach to the Arab region through implemenWorking
Paper
No.
45,
2009),
available
at
http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/downloa
d/wp/wpSeries2/WP452.pdf.
40. Syria is one of twenty-two Arab League member states and has since
November 2011 been temporarily suspended from the League:
Syria has been suspended from the Arab League over its failure to
end the bloodshed caused by brutal government crackdowns on prodemocracy protests in a move that will increase the international
pressure on President Bashar al-Assad. At an emergency session of
its 22 member states in Cairo to discuss the crisis, the league decided to exclude Syria until it implements the terms of an earlier
agreed peace deal to stop the violence. The league also agreed to impose economic and political sanctions on Syria over its failure to stop
the violence.
The decision was made with the support of eighteen of the twenty-one other
Arab League member states. David Batty & Jack Shenker, Syria Suspended
(Nov.
12,
2011),
from
Arab
League,
GUARDIAN
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/12/syria-suspended-arab-league.
However, it is understood that the action taken against Syria “does not
amount to a full suspension of membership from the regional body.” Arab
League Decides to Suspend Syria, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 13, 2011),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/11/201111121342948333.ht
ml. Indeed, the Arab League has continued to take an active role in trying to
negotiate an end to the conflict. “Arab League foreign ministers gathered in
Cairo on Sunday to push the Syrian opposition to attend the proposed Geneva II peace conference.” Report: Arab League to Press Syria Opposition Over
Peace Talks, RELIEFWEB (Nov. 3, 2013), http://reliefweb.int/report/syrianarab-republic/arab-league-press-syria-opposition-over-peace-talks; see, e.g.,
Bayoumy, supra note 29.
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tation of a similar convention by the Arab League. The Note
concludes with the suggestion that a convention that addresses
internal displacement in the Arab region by framing it as a regional issue, deserving of a regional solution, would well serve
the Arab League as a viable alternative to the current options
for providing protection and assistance to the region’s IDPs.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Legal Framework for Protection of IDPs
The absence of an international legal framework applicable to
IDPs reveals the unique and relatively invisible position in
which internally displaced persons exist. Although IDPs and
refugees often face similar factual conditions and require similar kinds of assistance, the two groups are classified separately
under international law, legally distinct by virtue of their differing relationships with their states of nationality or habitual
residence.41
The transboundary nature of the situation of refugees imposes a responsibility on the international community to meet refugees’ needs. 42 A refugee is a person who is, inter alia, displaced “outside the country of his nationality.” 43 The act of
crossing the border takes that person out of the sovereignty of
his home state and implicates international law.44 In contrast,
IDPs are, by definition, displaced within the borders of their
home state.45 As such, under traditional notions of sovereignty,
41. See, e.g., Won Kidane, Managing Forced Displacement by Law in Africa: The Role of the New African Union IDPs Convention, 44 VAND.
J.TRANSNT’L L. 1 (2011).
42. See generally Brian Barbour & Brian Gorlick, Embracing the Responsibility to Protect: A Repertoire of Measures Including Asylum for Potential
Victims, 20 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 533 (2008).
43. The U.N. defines a refugee as:
any person who . . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(A)(2), opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
44. See generally Barbour & Gorlick, supra note 42.
45. See GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT, supra note 1.
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the home state retains primary responsibility for IDPs needs.46
Very often, however, conditions within the home state have
caused the displacement, so the home state is unable or unwilling to meet those needs.47 Nonetheless, because IDPs remain
within their state, they do not become the concern of international law as do refugees.48
While this legal difference does not prohibit international
humanitarian organizations from assisting IDPs, it does limit
the extent to which these organizations can help.49 The dearth
of protection afforded IDPs led former U.N. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan to call internal displacement “the great tragedy of
our times,” and IDPs “among the most vulnerable of the human
family.”50
In the early 1990s, as internal displacement became more
widespread, the U.N. authorized the U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs to establish an “appropriate normative framework” that would state the current
norms and rights of IDPs and obligations of states toward
them.51 This framework became the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (“Guiding Principles”) and articulated for

46. Flavia Giustiniani, New Hopes and Challenges for the Protection of
IDPs in Africa: The Kampala Convention, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 347,
348 (2011).
47. Kidane, supra note 41, at 45.
48. Elizabeth E. Ruddick, The Continuing Constraint of Sovereignty: International Law, International Protection, and the Internally Displaced, 77
B.U. L. REV. 429, 440, 452 (1997).
49. For example, UNHCR was mandated by the U.N. General Assembly in
1950 to provide protection and assistance to refugees when host governments
cannot sufficiently do so. Internally displaced persons were not included in
the mandate. Refugee Convention, supra note 43. Since 1972, UNHCR has
been extended authority by the General Assembly to assist IDPs on an ad hoc
basis when the country requires assistance. Roberta Cohen, Humanitarian
Imperatives Are Transforming Sovereignty, 16 ILSA Q. 14, 15 (2008) [hereinafter Cohen, Humanitarian Imperatives]. This practical implication of the
distinct legal status for IDPs is rooted in “deference to traditional notions of
sovereignty.” Id.
50. Jan Egeland, foreword to GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT, supra note 1.
51. Representative of the Secretary-General, Internally Displaced Persons:
Rep. of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng,
Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1997/39, ¶
2, Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53 (Feb. 11, 1998) (by
Francis M. Deng).
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the first time rights of states toward IDPs.52 The Guiding Principles are recognized as a significant step in the evolution of a
doctrine of international protection for IDPs and they remain
the most important articulation of this protection on an international scale. 53 In 2005, the U.N. World Summit Outcome
document endorsed the Guiding Principles54 and expressed “resolve to take effective measures to increase the protection of
internally displaced persons.” 55 However, neither the World
Summit Outcome document nor the Guiding Principles are
binding on member states.56
As such, while refugees have been accorded international
protection for over sixty years,57 IDPs continue to occupy a lacuna of legal protection. No similar binding international
framework articulating standards for the protection and assistance of IDPs yet exists58 despite the increased visibility of the
plight of IDPs during the past decade. Indeed, amid this ongoing chasm of legal protection, the last decade has seen more
people displaced than ever before.59 The world now has almost
twice as many IDPs as refugees. 60 For example, by summer
2013, the number of displaced persons within Syria was rough52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1
(Sept. 16, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 World Summit Outcome]. For more on this,
see ALEX J. BELLAMY, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE GLOBAL EFFORT TO END
MASS ATROCITIES 133 (2009).
55. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 54, ¶ 132. This wording was
confirmed in a General Assembly resolution. G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/168 (Mar. 7, 2006). See also Cohen, Humanitarian Imperatives,
supra note 49, at 18 (referring to the World Summit Outcome, supra note 54).
56. Like all U.N. General Assembly resolutions, the World Summit Outcome is not a legally binding document, but “is more appropriately considered
a political commitment.” Saira Mohamed, Taking Stock of the Responsibility
to Protect, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 319, 328–29 & n.57 (2012); Giustiniani, supra
note 46, at 349.
57. Since 1951, the U.N. has recognized refugees as a special legal category possessing certain rights and owed certain obligations by the international
community. Refugee Convention, supra note 43.
58. Barbour & Gorlick, supra note 42, at 555.
59. See Global Overview 2011: People Internally Displaced by Armed Conflict and Violence, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CTR. (Apr. 2012),
http://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/global-overview-2011
[hereinafter Global Overview]; see also Cohen, Humanitarian Imperatives,
supra note 49.
60. Schmidt, supra note 27, at 485.
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ly four times the number of Syrians who fled the country as
refugees.61 The growth in the number of IDPs emphasizes that
the consideration of where the legal responsibility for this population falls requires serious attention and should be prioritized.
B. The Role of Regional Organizations
One forum suited to address legal responsibility for IDPs is
regional organizations. Regional organizations have long
served an important role in the international community.62 The
U.N. Charter (the “Charter”) encourages an active role for regional organizations, contemplating a relationship of support
and coexistence between regional organizations and the international U.N. system.63 The Charter does not define regional
organizations, but the term as used is generally interpreted
broadly to “focus appropriately on function rather than form.”64
One scholar has made this term more tangible, offering an interpretation of the regional arrangements contemplated by the
Charter as “less-than-global, state-based entities or associations that need not be treaty-based and that may include geographically, politically, or economically oriented organizations.”65 The U.N. Secretary-General recently called attention
to the primacy of the role the Charter envisioned for regional
organizations, noting that “[t]he architects of the United Na61. While at least two million Syrians were estimated to be internally displaced by January 2013, 600,000 Syrians had fled Syria into neighboring
countries by the same date. Anne Barnard, Dozens of Civilians Are Said to Be
TIMES
(Jan.
14,
2013),
Killed
by
Syrian
Airstrikes,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/15/world/middleeast/syria-launches-deadlyairstrikes-in-damascus-suburbs.html.
62. U.N. Secretary-General, The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/65/877-S/2011/393 (June 27, 2011) [hereinafter
Secretary-General’s Report on R2P].
63. Article 52 of the U.N. Charter encourages “the existence of regional
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”
U.N. Charter art. 52.
64. James Hickey, Challenges to Security Council Monopoly Power over the
Use of Force in Enforcement Actions: The Case of Regional Organizations, 10
INT’L LEGAL THEORY 69, 78 (2004).
65. Id.
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tions accorded a prominent place to regional arrangements in
their vision of the new world body.”66 He emphasized that this
original conception of regional organizations envisioned in the
Charter has been realized, with these organizations playing an
increasingly significant role in the world order.67
In addition to highlighting the importance of regional organizations generally, in recent years the U.N. has specifically recognized regional organizations as well-positioned to provide an
alternative to action by the Security Council or U.N. General
Assembly.68 The Secretary-General also emphasized specifically that the Charter “underline[s] the value of ongoing working
relationships among global, regional and sub-regional organizations for prevention and protection purposes.” 69 Indeed, in
the early twenty-first century, the U.N. has explicitly noted the
crucial role regional organizations play in the maintenance of
international peace and security.70 With numerous controversial examples of instances in which the Security Council did or
did not resolve to intervene “in time” to adequately protect a
population,71 an approach that would not require the same political and diplomatic considerations as those faced by the Security Council is attractive.72 A regional approach could thus
66. Secretary-General’s Report on R2P, supra note 62, ¶ 2.
67. Id. ¶ 2.
68. Id. ¶ 2.
69. Id. ¶ 5.
70. As one example, member states at the 2005 World Outcome Summit
“[r]ecogniz[ed] the important contribution to peace and security by regional
organizations.” 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 54, ¶ 93. The Secretary-General has since emphasized this recognition given in the World Summit Outcome. Secretary-General’s Report on R2P, supra note 62, ¶ 3.
71. For discussion of examples, see, e.g., Wed Nanda, The Future under
International Law of the Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria, 21
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 1 (2013); Alison Des Forges & Timothy Longman, Legal
Responses to Genocide in Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND
THE COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 49–68 (Eric Stover &
Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004) (discussing the inaction of the international
community and the OAU during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994); Simon
Chesterman, “Leading from Behind”: The Responsibility to Protect, the
Obama Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention after Libya, 25 ETHICS &
INT’L AFF. 279, 279–85 (2011).
72. This aligns with the statement of member states in the 2005 World
Summit Outcome document:
The international community, through the United Nations, also has
the responsibility to . . . help protect populations from genocide, war
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serve as an alternative to reliance on the Security Council to
act to maintain or restore international peace and security. The
high-level recognition of this both suggests and contributes to
the increasingly visible, active position that regional organizations are seen to play in preventing conflict and protecting
populations in the contemporary world.73
This is in line with a regionalist approach. Scholars advocating for regionalism, who take the view that regions are “significant in their own right, and not merely derivative of state power or global processes,”74 have presented and defended the position that regional institutions are singularly positioned to bring
about certain change that no other institution or actor could.75
These scholars suggest that regional institutions can be important and powerful forces for social and political change due
to the unique character of regions as both local and international.76
An illustrative example of regional organizations’ capacity to
spearhead solutions to contemporary problems is provided by
the leadership role that regional organizations are taking in
creating disaster response policy and addressing issues arising
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the
Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly
fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the
General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the
principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to
commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States
build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break
out.
2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 54, ¶139.
73. Cilja Harders & Matteo Legrenzi, Introduction to BEYOND
REGIONALISM: REGIONAL COOPERATION, REGIONALISM AND REGIONALIZATION IN
THE MIDDLE EAST 1 (Cilja Harders & Matteo Legrenzi eds., 2008).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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from migration due to climate change.77 Natural disasters and
climate change are two conspicuous examples that highlight
the fact that states in a particular region are often faced concurrently with “similar environmental phenomena and hazards.” 78 Regional organizations therefore may be best positioned to lead discussions on appropriate, vernacular solutions
tailored to these vernacular problems, which will best serve the
region, its states, and its populations.79 For the same reasons, a
regional organization would be well situated to address internal displacement, whether due to change in the political or
natural climate. As is poignantly demonstrated by the widespread displacement caused by conflict arising out of the Arab
Spring uprisings, the same factors may be the force for change
in many states throughout a region, making a regional organi-

77.
One particular area where regional organizations seem to be playing
a leading role is in the relationship between migration and climate
change. Regional processes to deal with labor migration have been
increasing in importance over the past decade or so . . . [Likewise,
w]ith growing recognition of the potential effects of climate change,
regional organizations are becoming aware that they have particular
roles to play in policy discussions. Regions are more likely to face
similar environmental phenomena and hazards and if (or when)
people are forced to leave their countries because of the effects of
climate change, they are likely to turn first to nearby countries.
Elizabeth Ferris & Daniel Petz, In the Neighborhood: The Growing Role of
Regional Organizations in Disaster Risk Management, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb.
2013),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/02/regionalorganizations-disaster-risk-ferris, at 3. Authors Ferris and Petz conclude
their study by arguing that their
research has shown that in almost all regions of the world, regional
organizations are playing increasingly active roles in disaster risk
management. While each region has unique characteristics that
shape the nature and activities of its regional bodies, it seems as if
they all (or almost all) see value in working together to prevent disasters and to a lesser extent to respond to disasters occurring in the
region.
Id. at 25.
78. Id. at 3.
79. Ferris & Petz, supra note 77, at 1–4. See also KATHERINE HAVER &
CONOR FOLEY, INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE ON STRENGTHENING PARTNERSHIP IN
DISASTER RESPONSE: BACKGROUND PAPER 2 (Oct. 2011), available at
http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/93533/Background%20paper%202.pdf.
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zation a fitting venue for crafting well-tailored solutions. While
these conflicts may be contained within a state, they affect the
region as a whole.80
Regional approaches to regional phenomena also bring important indirect benefits. One theory holds that “functional regional cooperation on specific issues can contribute to peace
and security, . . . [as] cooperation between countries on specific
practical issues can lead to cooperation on broader issues, leading to decreasing likelihood of conflict between the countries
and eventually to the development of regional identities.” 81
This would seem an especially valuable consequence for regional organizations plagued by disharmony. 82 Harnessing
such cooperation will be of increasing import in the contemporary era in which the value of regional institutions is garnering
much attention.83
It may be possible to counter the advocacy of a regional approach to internal displacement with the Responsibility to Protect or “R2P” doctrine.84 While there was much discussion in
the early twenty-first century of an emerging customary norm
recognizing the international community’s “responsibility to
protect” the citizens of a state when the state has failed to do
so, the doctrine has not been utilized consistently or successfully.85 It remains an issue of debate whether an international responsibility to step in would be beneficial to the international
community,86 but it is clear that a reliable R2P framework has
80. In early October, the Security Council “voiced ‘deep concern’ at the
consequences of the refugee crisis caused by the conflict, ‘which has a destabilizing impact on the entire region.’” U.N. Security Council Urges All Sides,
supra note 22.
81. This is called a functionalist approach. See, e.g., Ferris & Petz, supra
note 77, at 2; see also Louise Fawcett, Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism, 80 INT’L AFF. 429, 431 (2004).
82. See infra Parts III.A and III.B.2 for more on the Arab League’s reputation for weak leadership amid intra-regional noncooperation.
83. See Amitav Acharya & Alastair Iain Johnston, Comparing Regional
Institutions: An Introduction, in CRAFTING COOPERATION: REGIONAL
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1–31 (Amitav
Acharya & Alastair Iain Johnston eds., 2007).
84. For background on R2P, see generally, Barbour & Gorlick, supra note
42.
85. See Cohen, International Response, supra note 31, at 7.
86. Scholars have argued that “a well-defined, coordinated response where
states and the international community of actors including the U.N., regional
and sub-regional actors and civil society take responsibility according to an
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yet to crystallize.87 The applicability of the doctrine to situations of internal displacement also remains unclear.88 The R2P
doctrine thus requires further elucidation and clarification of
existing misconceptions about its use before it is considered as
a viable option to assist IDPs.89
With no indication that the R2P doctrine will solidify in the
near future,90 an additional benefit of a regional approach to
IDP protection may be to punt the thorny question of whether
and to what degree a responsibility on the part of the international community as a whole to care for a sovereign state’s nationals exists. A regional response provides an alternative; with
responsibility for IDPs rendered an intraregional duty, the controversial and nebulous R2P issue may be sidestepped altogether.91
II. THE AU’S APPROACH TO INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: AN
EMPHASIS ON REGIONAL COOPERATION
A. The Kampala Convention: Context, Characterizing Conditions, and Limitations
An examination of the background, objectives, and key provisions of the Convention sheds light on the conditions that gave
rise to an atmosphere ripe for its creation and illustrates what
aspects of this approach could be utilized for successful transfer
beyond the AU.
1. The Context: Africa and the African Union
As the Kampala Convention necessarily reflects values of the
AU, exploring the context of the AU’s history and character is

established R2P framework” is necessary to meet the shortcomings of state
response to humanitarian disasters in the twenty-first century world order.
Barbour & Gorlick, supra note 42, at 560.
87. See Edward C. Luck, The Responsible Sovereign and the Responsibility
to Protect, in 1 ANNUAL REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS 1-xxxiii to 1-x1ii
(Joachim W. Müller & Karl P. Sauvant eds., 2006–2007).
88. See, e.g., Cohen, International Response, supra note 31, at 7.
89. Barbour & Gorlick, supra note 42, at 555.
90. See Nanda, supra note 71. The effectiveness of an R2P framework is
also hindered by logistics, with no “international enforcement machinery” in
place to offer protection or assistance to IDPs. Cohen, International Response,
supra note 31, at 8.
91. Barbour & Gorlick, supra note 42.
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an essential starting place to further an understanding of the
foundations for this instrument. The AU was established in
2001 as the successor to the Organization of African Unity
(“OAU”),92 amid recognition by OAU member states of a need
for a regional organization better suited to serve the goals of a
developing, post-colonial continent. 93 With the signing of the
Constitutive Act, the AU became Africa’s premier intergovernmental organization, with fifty-four state parties as of November 2013.94
The moment in which the AU was established shaped its objectives as reflected in the structure and substance of the Constitutive Act, which in turn informed the Kampala Convention.
The AU was conceived of in the immediate post-Cold War
years, during which time regional organizations shifted with
the changing global order in the aftermath of several significant regional crises.95
Regional organizations formed during the Cold War were
predominantly established to protect the member states from
“external threats,” with the principal of sovereignty reigning
supreme.96 Regional organizations established during the midand late-twentieth century accordingly prioritized “collective
defense” over all other considerations. 97 After the Cold War,
however, this focus changed dramatically amid new recognition
of intraregional threats 98 and a related emphasis on the re-

92. “Established in 1963, the OAU had as its main goal the elimination of
colonization in Africa and the promotion of unity and solidarity among African states for the betterment of its peoples.” Stacy-Ann Elvy, Theories of
State Compliance with International Law: Assessing the African Union’s Ability to Ensure State Compliance with the African Charter and the Constitutive
Act, 41 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 75, 82 (2012).
93. The Organization of African Unity, DEP’T OF INT’L RELATIONS &
COOPERATION, http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/oau.htm (last
visited Jan. 19, 2013) (S. Afr.).
94. Morocco is the only African nation that is not an active member of the
AU. AU in a Nutshell, AFR. UNION, http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell (last
visited Nov. 14, 2013).
95. These crises include those in Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and Kosovo during
the 1990s. See Cohen, Humanitarian Imperatives, supra note 49, at 14; see
also Davis Brown, The Role of Regional Organizations in Stopping Civil
Wars, 41 A.F. L. Rev. 255, 250 (1997).
96. Brown, supra note 95, at 251.
97. Id. at 241–42.
98. Id. at 250.
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sponsibility of sovereign states toward each other.99 While the
principle of nonintervention by a member state in the internal
affairs of another had been a central tenet on which regional
organizations had formerly been based, 100 following the Cold
War “regional and global security perspectives” radically shifted toward a focus on preserving and fostering the relationships
between the states in a region.101
The AU was created during this shift, and the Constitutive
Act indeed reflects an emphasis on strengthening intraregional
responsibility. 102 Whereas the OAU was primarily concerned
with securing independent identities for the former colonies,
the Constitutive Act evidences an attempt on the part of the
AU to limit sovereignty “by defining sovereignty in terms of a
state’s willingness and capacity to provide protection to its nationals.”103 Reconceptualizing the role of the regional organization in this way allowed the AU to address and seek to “improve the normative framework for protecting and assisting
displaced persons . . . [and] strengthen [the] institutions” involved.104
Indeed, particular provisions of the Constitutive Act reveal
the notion that regional solutions to internal problems were
deemed well within the AU’s scope of concern. Most significantly, Article 4(h) codifies “the right of the Union to intervene in a
Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and
crimes against humanity.”105 Questions surround the scope and
definition of this intervention power,106 as neither the Constitu-

99. See Cohen, Humanitarian Imperatives, supra note 49.
100. Brown, supra note 95, at 237.
101. Id. at 251.
102. “Regional organizations now no longer needed for collective defense
have begun to assert a new role in collective security by stopping civil wars
and helping (or making) combatants achieve peace,” thus “the role of regional
organizations in preventing or stopping internal conflicts has expanded.” Id.
at 236–37.
103. Dyani-Mhango Ntombizozuko, Reflections on the African Union’s Right
to Intervene, 38 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 1, 11 (2012).
104. Abebe, supra note 38.
105. Constitutive Act, AFR. UNION art. 4(h) (July 11, 2000), available at
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/aboutau/constitutive_act_en.htm.
106. Some scholars have argued that the AU’s “right” of intervention is
more properly interpreted to be a duty:
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tive Act nor subsequent treaties or documents define the substance of the right or the procedure to follow when invoking
it.107 Further, there has not yet been an occasion for the judicial
organ of the AU to interpret the scope of the intervention power.108
At the time of writing, the AU had not exercised its Article
4(h) power to intervene in a member state without that state’s

[A] “right” implies that the AU does not have to intervene when circumstances that pertain to crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and genocide occur. A legal duty, on the other hand, may create legal
consequences for the AU if it fails to execute its obligation to intervene as compared to a discretionary “right to intervene.”
Ntombizozuko, supra note 103, at 12–13 (citing Nsongurua Udombana, When
Neutrality Is a Sin: The Darfur Crisis and the Crisis of a Humanitarian Intervention in Sudan, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 1149, 1157 n.42 (2005)).
107. Ntombizozuko provided an overview of the issues related to interpreting the intervention power:
It is unclear whether the AU Assembly may first conduct an investigation before determining if an intervention is necessary, or whether
it needs to first decide to intervene before finding out if indeed international crimes were committed in a member state. Article 4(h) requires that there must be a commission of an international crime to
necessitate an intervention . . . There is no institution operational
yet to interpret Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act or the AU Assembly’s decision to intervene or not to intervene. The African Court of
Justice [the AU institution with subject matter jurisdiction over the
interpretation and application of the Constitutive Act; any question
of international law; all acts, decisions, regulations, and directives of
AU organs; and circumstances that would constitute a breach of an
obligation owed to a state party or the AU] is not yet operational . . .
[but] will be helpful in interpreting Article 4(h) to ascertain the
meaning of intervention . . . The Constitutive Act provides that if
the organ responsible for its interpretation is not operational, the
AU Assembly can assume such function as long as the decision
reaches a two-thirds majority. This may be problematic, especially
when it comes to deciding on the meaning of the right to intervene,
as the AU Assembly may be embroiled in disagreements . . . There
has not been an instance where the meaning of the AU’s right to intervention has been questioned in practical terms. One hopes that
when that time comes the African Court of Justice will be fully operational.
Ntombizozuko, supra note 103, at 14–17.
108. The African Court of Justice would have jurisdiction over this question
of jurisdiction, but is not yet fully operational. See id. at 15–17.
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consent.109 Scholars posit that this is due to logistical and ideological hindrances; logistical, as the AU Assembly normally
meets only twice a year and assembly decisions require at least
a two-thirds majority vote of all members,110 and ideological,
“given the continent’s traditional reluctance to endorse interventionism.” 111 As such, the use of the Article 4(h) authority
would be both “time-consuming and fraught with political obstacles.”112 By this understanding, intervention pursuant to Article 4(h) “may not happen at all or may happen too late.”113
Other scholars have suggested that the provision’s lack of use
indicates that the AU remains uncomfortable with circumventing state sovereignty, and that it remains unclear whether the
“AU Assembly has, in fact, changed its stance of nonintervention in internal armed conflicts.”114 However, the existence of this provision suggests that the drafters at least desired
intraregional responsibility to coexist with sovereignty, to allow
for the possibility115 of intervention when deemed necessary.116
2. Key Provisions of the Kampala Convention
From early in the organization’s existence, there was commitment on the part of the AU to work to relieve the situation
of Africa’s displaced. 117 The Kampala Convention accordingly
reflects the AU’s foundational principles. The Convention fundamentally “reaffirm[s] the principle of the respect for sover-

109. Id. at 43–44. However the AU has exercised its right to intervene
through the consent of the member state involved (pursuant to Article 4(j)) on
at least three occasions: “in Burundi to build peace, intervened in Darfur to
enable the establishment of a more robust U.N. peace operation and to monitor the humanitarian crisis effectively, and intervened in Somalia to coordinate efforts to advance the cause of peace.” Id. at 33.
110. Constitutive Act, supra note 105, art. 7(1).
111. Bellamy, supra note 54, at 78–79, quoted in Ntombizozuko, supra note
103, at 44.
112. Bellamy, supra note 54, at 78–79, quoted in Ntombizozuko, supra note
103, at 44.
113. Ntombizozuko, supra note 103, at 44.
114. Id.
115. For more on the discussion of whether the authority to intervene is
more properly considered a right or a duty, see supra note 106.
116. Solomon, supra note 38.
117. Chaloka Beyani, Recent Developments: The Elaboration of a Legal
Framework for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, 50 J.
AFR. L. 187, 189–90 (2006).
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eign equality” among member states,118 and makes clear that
nothing within it is intended to supersede the notion that
states retain primary responsibility for the persons within
their borders. 119 However, the Convention’s substance and
structure also suggest that the AU recognized the benefits for
regional accountability that exists prominently alongside this
emphasis on sovereign equality. As indicated by the first objective “to promote and strengthen regional and national
measures” 120 for preventing displacement and assisting and
protecting IDPs, the AU sought to introduce this notion on regional cooperation as a buttress to national action.121
The Convention strikes this balance by framing states parties’ substantive obligations not as individual duties the state
owes only to its IDPs, but as responsibilities that states owe as
part of a network of regional actors.122 For instance, states parties are obligated to extend adequate humanitarian assistance
where appropriate to communities in need,123 and when unable
to provide sufficient support to their own IDPs, states parties
are obligated to request assistance from relevant regional actors.124 They are required to cooperate with those actors who
subsequently render assistance.125 In this they must “allow rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel” to the internally displaced; sovereignty is
given no place in that arrangement.126 States parties are further required to provide resources to assist and protect other
states’ IDPs when assistance is requested by that other state or
by the Conference of States Parties, 127 as well as to protect
IDPs regardless of the cause of displacement.128 Upon ratifica118. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, pmbl.
119. Id. art. 5(1), (12), art. 7(2).
120. Id. art. 2(a).
121. See Giustiniani, supra note 46.
122. For instance, states parties must “ensure assistance to internally displaced persons by meeting their basic needs as well as allowing and facilitating rapid and unimpeded access by humanitarian organizers and personnel.”
Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 3(1)(j).
123. Id. art. 9(2)(b).
124. Id. art. 5(6).
125. Id. art. 5(6).
126. Id. art. 5(7).
127. Id. arts. 6(1), (2).
128. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 9(1)(a). One can imagine a
regional twist to this obligation; for instance, it would require a state to ren-
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tion, states parties are required to implement the obligations
into domestic laws and policies,129 including incorporating the
Convention’s substantive obligations into relevant legislation130
as well as creating “an authority or body” that will be “responsible for . . . cooperating with relevant international organizations or agencies, and civil society organizations, where no such
authority or body exists.”131
The Convention also codifies the obligations of a wide range
of other regional actors. One objective of the Convention is to
“provide for the respective obligations, responsibilities, and
roles of armed groups, non-state actors and other relevant actors, including civil society organizations, with respect to the
prevention of internal displacement and the protection of, and
assistance to, internally displaced persons.”132
Additionally, the Kampala Convention specifically articulates
the role and obligations of the AU vis-à-vis internal displacement in Africa.133 First, the Convention incorporates the Constitutive Act’s intervention power, and gives the AU a right to
intervene either upon request of two-thirds of the AU Assembly
in situations deemed “grave circumstances,”134 or upon unilateral request by a state party “to restore peace and security.”135
The AU is also obligated to provide necessary support to states
parties in the prevention of displacement and in the protection
of IDPs in the form of coordinating the mobilization of resources and collaborating with international organizations,
states parties, civil society organizations (“CSOs”), and humanitarian organizations.136
der protection to IDPs uprooted in its territory due to conflict in a neighboring state.
129. Id. art. 3(2).
130. Id. art. 3(2)(a).
131. Id. art. 3(2)(b).
132. Id. art. 2(1)(e). For instance, Article 6 establishes the obligations of
international organizations and humanitarian agencies are established; Article 7 addresses members of armed groups (who “shall be held criminally responsible for their acts which violate the rights of IDPs under international
law and national law”); Article 10 addresses the duties of private stakeholders causing displacement through development projects. See id. arts. 6, 7, 10.
133. Id. art. 8.
134. Id. art. 8(1). Grave circumstances are therein defined as war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity. Id.
135. Id. art. 8(2).
136. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 8(3).
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Through all of these provisions, the Convention communicates the AU’s position that meeting the needs of IDPs involves
a web of cooperating regional actors.137 The Convention articulates duties that recognize a multi-layered support system of
states, non-state actors, and the AU by which this understanding is made manifest. In light of the increased reliance on and
noted benefits of regional organizations,138 the AU has taken a
logical and forward-looking approach to a problem that remained unsolvable when traditionally considered to be a purely
national responsibility.
3. Limitations of the Convention
However groundbreaking the Convention may be, the inevitable limitations of the Convention illustrate the downsides of
a regionally cooperative approach to the protection and assistance of IDPs. Noteworthy potential limitations are the hesitancy of states to ratify, the questionable strength of the Convention’s enforcement mechanism, and the effectiveness of the
AU’s intervention power.
The majority of signatories to the Convention had yet to ratify the document at the time of publication, and over two-thirds
of AU member states had neither signed nor ratified.139 Political unpopularity at the state level and the large financial commitments that accompany ratification are understood to be
primary reasons for states’ reluctance to sign or ratify the Convention. 140 The political climate in many states is such that
displacement is not prioritized on the national agenda. 141 In
other cases, the Convention has been seen as politically unpopular due to the positive obligations it places upon ratifying
states.142 Specifically, the obligation to bring national laws into
compliance (which could be expensive or represent a major

137. For more on the drafting process of the Kampala Convention, see
Giustiniani, supra note 46.
138. Ferris & Petz, supra note 77.
139. Twenty of the thirty-five AU member states that had signed the Convention had not ratified it as of January 2013. Kampala Convention, IDMC,
supra note 34.
140. See Giustiniani, supra note 46.
141. Taylor, Lopas & Soloman, supra note 38, at 48.
142. Id.
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change in policy), 143 the obligation to prevent displacement
from private development projects,144 and the obligation to provide reparations upon displacement145 all serve as obstacles to
ratification.
A second limitation is the concern that the Convention does
not have the strong enforcement mechanisms necessary to ensure compliance with its guidelines.146 Scholars have commented that the Convention will hinge on compliance at the national
level as well as on effective oversight by the AU.147 Yet, it has
been argued that the Convention’s oversight system is weak,
and that the AU will not be able to compel compliance.148 Indeed, while the Convention has certain oversight functions in
place, it is not clear what power the AU has to compel compliance.
For instance, the Convention obligates states parties to implement measures at the national level “for monitoring and
evaluating the effectiveness and impact of the humanitarian
assistance delivered to IDPs,”149 and for the establishment of “a
Conference of States Parties . . . to monitor and review the im143. Many states parties of the Convention simply do not have the financial
assets that ratification would require to bring national laws into compliance
with the Convention’s obligations. Id.
144. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 10.
145. Id. art. 12.
146. Lauren Groth, Engendering Protection: An Analysis of the 2009 Kampala Convention and Its Provisions for Internally Displaced Women, 23 INT’L
J. REFUGEE L. 221, 251 (2011); Giustiniani, supra note 46, at 370. A similar
weakness in the Constitutive Act has also been highlighted; scholars have
suggested that “the Constitutive Act should be revised to more effectively
ensure state compliance” with its principles and the principles of the AU
Charter. Elvy, supra note 92, at 88.
147. Abebe, supra note 38, at 52; Giustiniani, supra note 46, at 370; Ferris
& Petz, supra note 77.
148. Giustiniani, supra note 46, at 370. It has also been noted that it may
not be possible to force compliance by non-state actors who are not parties to
the Convention but who are nonetheless the subject of obligations within it.
These include international organizations and humanitarian agencies who
are the subjects of Article 6, and members of armed groups who are the subjects of Article 7. Analysis: African IDP Convention Fills a Void in Humanitarian
Law,
IRIN
(Oct.
27,
2009),
http://www.irinnews.org/report/86762/analysis-african-idp-convention-fills-avoid-in-humanitarian-law.
149. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 9(2)(m). This may be done
pursuant to assistance by international organizations, humanitarian agencies, CSOs, and other regional actors. Id. art. 9(3).
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plementation of the objectives of the Convention,” 150 which
would meet regularly pursuant to AU facilitation.151 This provision further obligates states to “enhance their capacity for
cooperation and mutual support under the auspices of the Conference of the States Parties.”152 This system is of obvious practical import; with no oversight function, states that ratify the
Convention have no incentive to take the challenging and costly steps to implement the provisions into national laws. An
oversight function ensures that there are repercussions for
states that do not comply.153 Such provisions accordingly help
to facilitate the Convention and to provide necessary support to
encourage its implementation.154 It remains to be seen whether
states will comply with their obligations post-ratification and,
if not, whether the oversight system in place will effectively
compel compliance. If these concerns are realized, the ability of
the Convention to accomplish its goals would be jeopardized.
Finally, the effect of the AU’s intervention power pursuant to
Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act and incorporated into Article 8 of the Kampala Convention has been questioned.155 What
is clear is that there are specific limits to the intervention power: it may only be exercised in cases of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide, 156 and any intervention would
first depend on the AU being willing and able to facilitate the
intervention.157 As noted above, the intervention power has yet
150. Id. art. 14(1).
151. Id. art. 14(3).
152. Id. art. 14(2).
153. As stated by the president of the International Committee of the Red
Cross, Jakob Kellenberger, “[t]he crucial challenge now is . . . ensuring that
once the convention is signed and ratified by as many states as possible, it is
actually implemented and respected. States must now take concrete steps to
implement the convention into their own national legislation and regulation
systems, and develop plans of action to address issues of displacement.”
Analysis: African IDP Convention, supra note 148.
154. See Giustiniani, supra note 46.
155. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 8.
156. But the Constitutive Act does not define these crimes. It seems the
drafters intended the definitions of these international crimes to mirror the
definitions already codified in statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, and the Rome
Statute. Ntombizozuko, supra note 103, at 13–14 (restating an explanation
by Tiyanjana Maluwa, AU’s counsel the drafting process, provided in Tiyanjana Maluwa, The OAU/African Union and International Law: Mapping
New Boundaries or Revisiting Old Terrain?, 98 ASIL PROC. 232, 236 (2004)).
157. Ntombizozuko, supra note 103, 20–24.

380

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 39:1

to be exercised,158 and the right of intervention has not been
defined in either the Constitutive Act or the Kampala Convention.159 Critics argue that the intervention authority has been
left too vague, and will require clarification before it can be put
to effective use. 160 If this is so, it could hinder the effective
functioning of one of the most innovative provisions of the Convention.
B. The Prevalence of Internal Displacement and Regional Cooperation
Several influential conditions present in Africa while the
Kampala Convention was under consideration can be viewed as
significant to the instrument’s creation and eventual ratification. Specifically, the prevalence of internal displacement in
Africa and the cooperation between member states, the U.N.,
and other regional actors were determinative of the Convention’s viability.161
1. The Prevalence of Internal Displacement Across Africa
The drafters have indicated that the Convention was formed
amidst recognition of the need to address the disproportionate
number of IDPs in Africa, in light of the gap in protection due

158. “The AU has not yet exercised its right to intervene as envisaged in
Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, which does not require the consent of
member states,” though the AU has exercised interventions with the state’s
consent. Id. at 43–44. For more on this generally, see id.
159. See infra Part II.A.1. Thus far, the “assumption has been that the AU’s
right to intervene can be equated to the use of force. This assumption is based
on the fact that, in order to exercise this right, the AU has made provisions
for the establishment of an armed force whose responsibility includes intervention as contemplated in the Constitutive Act. Less intrusive means of intervention are listed outside this right.” Ntombizozuko, supra note 103, at 17.
160. “Further, the AU may be barred from exercising this right as it appears that the principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and territorial integrity of the AU member states are interpreted restrictively. The AU must
deal with these issues before an attempt to exercise the right to intervene is
made.” Id. at 1.
161. This list is not meant to be exhaustive. There are many other factors
that contributed to the AU’s ability to create the Convention in 2009 and to
its ratification in late 2012, but these stand out to the author as noteworthy
and, at least, a starting point.
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to the absence of a binding international legal regime.162 While
displacement exists in every region of the globe,163 the problem
is more widespread in Africa than on any other continent.164 As
a continent, Africa had the highest number of internally displaced persons in the years leading up to the AU Executive
Council order to draft the Convention.165 IDPs also vastly outnumber refugees in Africa.166 Displacement thus permeates life
on the continent in a way that it does not in other areas where
the issue is not as prevalent, and the issue was familiar and
tangible to heads of state and the drafters in a way that it may
not have been in a region not experiencing the phenomenon on
such a large scale.167
Recognition of the severity of internal displacement on the
continent was accordingly a major impetus behind the Convention. 168 Indeed, as expressed in the Explanatory Note to the
Convention, states parties created the document “conscious of
the fact that the African continent has the largest number of
refugees, internally displaced persons, and returnees.” 169 A
perception of the commonality of internal displacement in Africa appears to have fostered the framing of internal displace162. Explanatory Note on the African Union Convention for the Protection
and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), AFR. UNION,
http://www.internaldisplacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/5A1
FC4CC9028079DC12577450048DE13/$file/Kampala%20Convention%20%20Explanatory%20Note.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Explanatory Note].
163. In addition to Africa, there are IDPs in countries on every inhabited
continent of the globe. Colombia is the country with the most IDPs (with
around 4 million IDPs), followed by Iraq (with an estimated 2.5 million IDPs),
Turkey (with over a million IDPs), and India (with an estimated 500,000
IDPs). Global Overview, supra note 59, at 8–9.
164. At least twenty-seven of Africa’s fifty-four countries have internally
displaced persons, with at least 40% of the world’s 28.8 million IDPs located
MIGRATION
ONLINE,
in
African
countries.
Africa,
FORCED
http://www.forcedmigration.org/browse/regional/africa.htm (last visited Aug.
20, 2013); see also Kampala Convention, IDMC, supra note 34.
165. Africa, FORCED MIGRATION ONLINE, supra note 164. For more on the
drafting process, see infra Part II.A.1.
166. Analysis: African IDP Convention, supra note 148.
167. Giustiniani, supra note 46.
168. Solomon, supra note 38, at 83–84. Indeed, the preamble presents the
Convention as a vernacular solution for a problem that disproportionately
affects Africa. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, pmbl.
169. Explanatory Note, supra note 162. This document is nonbinding.
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ment as a distinctly African problem, which likely facilitated
the cooperation necessary to bring the Convention into being.170
It is difficult to say whether the Convention would have garnered the same political support without such widespread
awareness resulting from its omnipresence.
2. Cooperation Between African States, the U.N., and Other
Regional Actors
Cooperation between African States and outside actors was
also influential in the creation of the Convention. Although initiated by the AU Executive Council and coordinated by the AU
Secretariat, the Kampala Convention was created during a
five-year process involving a comprehensive team of AU member states, U.N. representatives, legal experts, and a variety of
civil society and regional organizations.171
The AU ensured that the project had the support, participation, and commentary of a wide range of regional actors.172 Indeed, the drafting and negotiation of the terms of the Convention were inclusive and cooperative processes, characterized by
the involvement and input of partner organizations and experts.173 UNHCR was involved and provided support throughout the process.174 CSOs were included in the negotiations, offering comments on issues felt to be inadequately addressed in
initial drafts. 175 NGOs had (limited) involvement as well. 176
170. See id.
171. Solomon, supra note 38, at 85 n.2. The African Union Executive Council created the team in response to a decision in 2004 for the AU Commission
to collaborate with relevant cooperating partners to ensure that IDPs would
be provided with appropriate legal protection. Abebe, supra note 38, at 32.
172. Abebe, supra note 38, at 33 (the author comments that involving outside actors in this process was “notable”).
173. Id. at 31–41.
174. Volker Türk, Restructuring Refuge and Settlement: Responding to the
Global Dynamics of Displacement, 28 REFUGE 117, 124 (2011).
175. Forced Displacement, Citizenship and Statelessness in Africa: Report
of a Civil Society Consultation on African Union Mechanisms and the Protection of Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Citizenship Rights 6–9
(Kampala,
Uganda,
Oct.
19–20,
2009),
available
at
http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/research_pdf/ConsultativeMeeting.10
2009.pdf.
176. On the role of NGOs, one scholar comments, “NGOs participated in the
drafting process both within the framework of the Consultative Group and
also by providing a written submission. It should, however, be stated that the
role of NGOs was considerably limited,” as “very few African NGOs . . . have
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NGOs and CSOs both play a vital role in assisting and protecting IDPs in the field in Africa177 and are thus well situated to
comment on the problem. Indeed, these organizations may be
in a position to best represent the needs of IDPs and to make
sure the IDPs’ position is heard. 178 The inclusion of these
groups demonstrates the AU’s pragmatic approach to the creation of a Convention well suited to address the realities of displacement on the continent.
The AU also invited legal experts, acting in an independent
capacity, to comment on the initial draft of the Convention.179
Later drafts drew heavily upon their suggestions for structure
and content.180 The input of these experts included robust debate on the balance between the notions of state sovereignty,
regional responsibility, and intervention. 181 The contributions
of these experts were significant; their suggestions directly resulted in broadening the AU’s oversight role to allow for intervention during “grave circumstances” causing displacement.182
The inclusion of this provision highlights the value of a collaborative drafting process that draws on the input of a variety of
experts and represents various perspectives.183
Additionally, the U.N. proffered much support of the AU’s
development and leadership in Africa, which was significant to
the formation of the collaborative climate in which the Convention was created.184 Even prior to the drafting process, the U.N.
had encouraged the AU to craft regional solutions to displace-

sufficient expertise in humanitarian and forced displacement areas.” Abebe,
supra note 38, at 36.
177. See Elizabeth Ferris, “The Role of Civil Society in Ending Displacement and Peacebuilding” [Speech], BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, Mar. 13, 2008,
available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2008/03/13-civilsociety-ferris.
178. “In some countries . . . [CSOs] play very important roles in monitoring
IDP situations and often serve as fora for IDPs to make their voices heard. In
some cases, [CSOs] are given formal roles in supporting solutions for IDPs.”
Id.
179. Abebe, supra note 38, at 36.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 35.
182. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 8.
183. See Giustiniani, supra note 46.
184. In 2005, for instance, the U.N. committed to partnering with the AU to
bring positive developments to the continent. World Summit Outcome, supra
note 54.
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ment in Africa.185 And in 2006, the U.N. and the AU entered
into a partnership to promote the AU; the U.N. SecretaryGeneral and the AU Commission Chairperson signed a declaration, the main objective of which was “to enhance the capacity
of the AU Commission and African sub-regional organizations
to act as effective U.N. partners in addressing the challenges to
human security in Africa.”186 The AU took the official position
in these discussions that the U.N. system as a whole would
benefit from the AU taking primary responsibility for “certain
tasks on the African continent.” 187 The agreement reveals a
perceived “common commitment” to assist in “advancing Africa’s development and regional integration.”188 This support of
the U.N. provided legitimacy to the AU as it grew into its role
as a regional organization.
The Kampala Convention shows that the AU addressed the
continent’s displacement issues with a regional approach, imposing duties on states parties to seek the assistance of other
states and regional actors when independently unable to meet
the needs of the displaced, as well as duties on myriad nonstate actors. In addition, the AU was granted authority to intervene in grave circumstances affecting the security of
IDPs.189
While this cooperative approach has limitations, the interconnected web of accountability which it weaves for regional
actors makes it possible that future crises will be prevented
and that the protection and assistance needs of those already
185. For example, in a 2001 Report to the Security Council, the U.N. Secretary-General endorsed a regional solution to the issue of refugees and IDPs in
Africa: “The response to this challenge should take into account the linkages
that exist between the countries in the sub-region.” U.N. Secretary-General,
Report of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Pursuant to the Resolution 1346, U.N. Doc. S/2001/513 (May
23, 2001), ¶¶ 3–4.
186. Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: A Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union, G.A. Res. 61/630, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/630, Annex (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation]. In the 2005 World Summit Outcome, the member states agreed to
the development and implementation of a ten-year plan for capacity building
with the AU. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 54.
187. Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation, supra note 186.
188. Id.
189. As discussed above, this is pursuant to certain procedures; intervention is by either the Assembly’s decision or by request of a state party for assistance. See Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 8(1), (2).
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displaced will be better met. It remains to be seen whether this
approach will provide an effective alternative to traditional
methods of protection. In the meantime, its very existence is
beneficial to the building of intraregional cooperation, accountability, and self-sufficiency in Africa.
III. OUT OF AFRICA: TRANSFERRING THE REGIONAL APPROACH
TO THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES
This approach to internal displacement, still nascent in Africa, has yet to be utilized by other regional organizations. 190
This section will apply the factors identified above to the current internal displacement crisis in Syria. It will argue that
despite differences in the regions and the regional organizations involved, a cooperative approach would be viable for the
Arab League as well, and, if adopted, could provide relief for
contemporary displacement crises such as the one currently
ongoing in Syria.
A. The Arab League’s Characterizing Principles and Objectives
It was argued above that the foundational principles and
characteristics of the AU were influential in the creation of the
Kampala Convention and are reflected in its substantive provisions.191 The principles and nature of the Arab League would
likewise influence the character of an IDP convention and are
thus relevant to the present inquiry.
The Arab League was founded in 1945192 and is the world’s
oldest existing regional organization.193 Comprised of twentytwo member states,194 it is the Arab region’s most prominent

190. As noted, the Assembly of the Organization of American States passed
a non-binding resolution encouraging member states to consider adjusting
national laws to better protect and assist IDPs. See supra note 35.
191. See supra Part II.A.
192. See Pact of the League of Arab States, Mar. 22, 1945, 70 U.N.T.S. 248,
252 [hereinafter “Arab League Pact”].
193. Pinfari, supra note 39.
194. As discussed supra note 40, Syria has been suspended since late 2011,
following an Arab League resolution to suspend the country if the government failed to cease violent activity against civilians. See Batty & Shenker,
supra note 40; MacFarquhar, Arab League Votes to Suspend Syria over
Crackdown, supra note 25. The Arab League has nonetheless maintained
involvement with seeking a solution to the Syrian conflict. See Bayoumy, supra note 29.
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and significant regional organization. 195 The League was
founded following the Second World War, as states of the region struggled to emerge from the hegemony of colonizing European powers.196 It was created as “part of a broad and ambitious political project,” in a moment in which some involved envisioned “the creation of a single Arab state.”197 The organization grew out of a time in which the region was seeking to redefine itself, and in that sought both “unity and independence.”198
Indeed, the foundational document, the Pact of the League of
Arab States (the “Pact”), states that the organization was established to “draw closer the relations between member
states.”199 Going forward, League members were “to consider in
a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.”200
Contrasting with this quest for unity is the Pact’s more prominent emphasis on the principle of sovereignty.201 The preamble
reveals this dichotomy between cooperation and independence.
While states were to “direct their efforts toward the goal of the
welfare of all the Arab States, their common weal,” that endeavor was to be undertaken only upon a “basis of respect for
the independence and sovereignty” of member states. 202 And
while the Pact provides for a Council with some oversight function to give binding judgments on disputes between two states,
those decisions only bind the states that accept them.203 This is
one indication that the states parties sought to retain independent authority at the expense of regional coexistence,204 a
characterizing focus on sovereignty that has remained in the
intervening decades.205
195. David Romano & Lucy Brown, Regional Organizations, Regional Identities and Minorities: The Arabs and the Kurdish Question, in BEYOND
REGIONALISM, supra note 73, at 157, 157.
196. I. Pogany, The League of Arab States: An Overview, 21 BIHAR L.J. 41,
41 (1989).
197. Pinfari, supra note 39, at 1.
198. Pogany, supra note 196.
199. Arab League Pact, supra note 192, art. 2.
200. Id.
201. As reflected in several articles of the Pact. See, e.g., id. arts. 18, 20; see
also Romano & Brown, supra note 195, at 157.
202. Arab League Pact, supra note 192, pmbl.
203. Romano & Brown, supra note 195.
204. Pogany, supra note 196.
205. Romano & Brown, supra note 195.
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It has been argued that one explanation for the continued,
near-constant conflict in the Arab region may be this presence
of both sovereignty and pan-Arabism 206 in the agenda of the
Arab League.207 This dichotomy may cause “role conflict,” stymying the development of a regional identity and thereby contributing to regional conflict.208 Regardless of the merits of that
position, this dual agenda should not be deemed fatal to the
creation of a regional framework to address regional problems
such as internal displacement.
As explored above, the AU has sought to emphasize cooperation without sacrificing respect for sovereignty,209 demonstrating that advancing a regional approach to internal displacement need not come at the expense of relinquishing an emphasis on independence. It follows that while the Arab League has
historically and contemporarily emphasized the sovereignty of
its member states, such a stance would not necessarily be dispositive of a viable regional framework to address issues facing
the region. The League could thus incorporate a focus on cooperation without losing its emphasis on sovereignty and independence. This approach may appeal simultaneously to the
strong sense of sovereign equality and to pan-Arabism.210

206. The term “pan-Arabism” is used generally to refer to “a social and political movement that supported the unification of the Arab world,” which
emerged around the turn of the twentieth century and was tied to the quest
for independence from colonizing powers. For background on pan-Arabism
and its influence on geopolitical concerns since the mid-twentieth century,
see Bassam Tibi, The Fundamentalist Challenge to the Secular Order in the
Middle East, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 191 (1999). The author notes that
“[o]n a regional level, the Arab states as outlined in the Arab League’s charter have sought to achieve the political goal of pan-Arabism: the pursuit of
Arab unity.” Id. at 191.
207. Michael Barnett, Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System, 37 INT’L STUDIES Q. 271, 282–84 (1993).
208. Id.
209. See supra Part II.A.
210. It is recalled that the AU drafters have been clear that the Convention
is not intended to undermine the notion that states retain primary responsibility for their nationals; it is also recalled that the Article 8 intervention
power may only be triggered upon consent of the state at issue or by twothirds of the Assembly members. Further, as discussed below, there is some
indication that the recent Arab Spring uprisings have occasioned change to
the role the Arab League seeks to play in the region. See infra Part III.C.
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B. Key Principles and Limitations of an Arab League Convention on Internal Displacement
1. Provisions of a Regional Approach to Protecting and Assisting IDPs in the Arab Region and Application to the Current
Situation in Syria
For an effective convention to address the problem of internal
displacement in the Arab region, the Arab League should replicate the provisions that have been essential to the regional approach of the Kampala Convention. Specifically, the League
should build into the document provisions emphasizing cooperation between and among state parties and other regional actors,211 and establish a right of intervention for the AU in cases
of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, similar
to those provisions within the Kampala Convention.212
If Syria was a party to a similar Arab League convention for
the protection and assistance of IDPs, it would be obligated to
bring its national laws into compliance with the convention and
to fulfill those obligations in the case of displacement. For instance, Syria would have a duty to fully cooperate with aidgiving organizations. Neighboring states parties would be obligated to assist if requested by Syria to help meet the needs of
IDPs. In the event that the Syrian government proved unable
to provide sufficient protection and assistance, the Arab
League would have the authority to facilitate assistance and
support from non-state actors, and to intervene on behalf of the
displaced if the situation was deemed, by the other member
states or by an established council, to be of such grave circumstance to warrant intervention.213

211. The emphasis on regional cooperation is manifested in the Kampala
Convention in such substantive provisions as the obligations upon the states
parties to, inter alia, seek assistance of other states and humanitarian agencies when unable to provide adequately for their own IDPs (art. 5(6)); to provide that assistance when requested (art. 6(1), (2)); and to participate in the
Conference of the States Parties oversight mechanism (art. 14). As noted
above, the Convention emphasized that these provisions were not intended to
detract from the territorial integrity and primary responsibility of states for
their own populations (see arts. 5(1), 5(12), 7(2)). Kampala Convention, supra
note 33.
212. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 8(1).
213. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, arts. 1–9.
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In the current situation, Syria would likely be found in violation of its substantive obligations to assist and protect its IDPs.
Both sides of the conflict would be in violation of Article 7,
which prohibits members of armed groups during armed conflict from, inter alia, “hampering the provision of protection and
assistance to internally displaced persons under any circumstances,” “impeding humanitarian assistance and passage of all
relief consignments, equipment and personnel to internally
displaced persons,” and “attacking or otherwise harming humanitarian personnel and resources or other materials deployed for the assistance or benefit of internally displaced persons.”214 It is unclear whether either the Syrian government’s
reaction or that of opposition forces would differ if the country
were under a legal obligation to cooperate with humanitarian
actors seeking to render assistance. Further, the confirmed use
of chemical weapons in Syria215 would meet the threshold for a

214. Syria’s continuing non-cooperation with humanitarian agencies would
be a direct violation of Article 5(6) and Article 7 of the Kampala Convention.
See supra note 24 (regarding the non-cooperation on the part of Syrian authorities to aid-giving organizations); Kampala Convention, supra note 33,
art. 7(6)(b), (g), (h).
215. In August 2013, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon commissioned a
team of inspectors to determine whether evidence corroborated reports that
chemical weapons had been used during the conflict in Syria. Following the
team’s investigations, a U.N. Report was issued which “confirmed that a
deadly chemical arms attack caused a mass killing in Syria [in August] and
for the first time provided extensive forensic details of the weapons used,
which strongly implicated the Syrian government.” Rick Gladstone & C.J.
Chivers, Forensic Details in U.N. Report Point to Assad’s Use of Gas, N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
16,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/world/europe/syria-united-nations.html.
In remarks to the press following his Security Council briefing on the Report,
the Secretary-General stated, “The findings are beyond doubt and beyond the
pale. This is a war crime.” Id. In a note accompanying the published Report,
the Secretary-General conveys
profound shock and regret at the conclusion that chemical weapons
were used on a relatively large scale, resulting in numerous casualties, particularly among civilians and including many children. The
Secretary-General condemns in the strongest possible terms the use
of chemical weapons and believes that this act is a war crime and
grave violation of the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare and other relevant rules of customary international law . . . The Secretary-General reiterates that any use of
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finding of grave circumstances warranting intervention by the
Arab League. 216 Whether actual or effective intervention followed would hinge on decisive and cooperative action by the
Arab League delegates,217 as well as on the existence of sufficient resources and will on the part of the Arab League to use
force for this purpose.218
Such a convention would add a critical alternative to the current inadequate options for the displaced in Syria. It would obligate Syria, its fellow Arab states, and the Arab League to adequately provide for the IDPs whose needs currently are severely unaddressed.219 As there have been documented violations of international criminal law,220 the League could exercise
a right of intervention (if codified) and use force to intervene to
chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances is a grave violation of international law.
U.N. Secretary-General, Note accompanying the Rep. on the Alleged Use of
Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 Aug. 2013, submitted by the Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical
Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic (Sept. 13, 2013), available at
http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/Secretary_General_Report
_of_CW_Investigation.pdf; see also UN Official Says Chemical Weapons Inspectors Begin Destroying Syrian Stockpile, Machinery, WASH. POST (Oct. 6,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/un-official-sayschemical-weapons-inspectors-begin-destroying-syrian-stockpilemachinery/2013/10/06/c166f608-2e70-11e3-9ddd-bdd3022f66ee_story.html.
216. See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, Commissioner Urges Action on Syria, N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
18,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/19/world/middleeast/united-nationscommissioner-urges-action-on-syria.html. (This conclusion is made assuming
that an identical right of intervention to that in the Kampala Convention was
codified by the Arab League, which would—as discussed—authorize the organization to intervene in instances of war crimes, genocide, and crimes
against humanity. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 8(1)).
217. The Arab League’s Pact requires at least majority vote. Arab League
Pact, supra note 192, art. 7(1). The AU Constitutive Act establishes a twothirds majority of voting members to agree to a decision, supra note 105, art.
7(1).
218. As is the case with the AU’s intervention power. See Ntombizozuko,
supra note 103, at 43–48.
219. Elizabeth Ferris, Kemal Kirişci & Salman Shaikh, Syrian Crisis: Massive Displacement, Dire Needs and a Shortage of Solutions, BROOKINGS INST.
(Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/09/18-syriahumanitarian-political-crisis-ferris-shaikh-kirisci.
220. See Gladstone & Chivers, Forensic Details in U.N. Report Point to Assad’s Use of Gas, supra note 215.
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protect IDPs suffering from these violations. While it is impossible to know if any substantive protections afforded by such a
convention would be effective if applied to the current situation
in Syria, it would at least provide an alternative to the bleak
options that now exist.
2. Learning from the Kampala Convention’s Limitations
The first limitation of the Kampala Convention discussed
above was states’ reluctance to ratify. Unpacking the likely
reasons behind that reluctance promotes an understanding of
the ways a regional approach could be improved upon when
transferred beyond the AU. The hesitation among AU member
states to ratify the Convention has been attributed to political
hesitations with regard to certain obligations that would result,
such as compensating the displaced and the obligation to bring
national guidelines into compliance, which may be costly and
unpopular domestically.221 Concern over the requisite financial
resources and weak political will necessary to bring domestic
laws into compliance with a convention’s guidelines could be
expected to hinder ratification; 222 few Arab states currently
have domestic provisions to protect the displaced.223 The Arab
League would therefore likely face hesitations due to economic
hindrances and political hesitations related to requiring these
domestic changes, which would hold up the ratification process.224 To counter that, the League could encourage states to
replicate steps taken during the AU’s ratification process, intended to induce ratification without sacrificing substance. For
instance, ratification in the Gambia was subsequent to an initiative to inform national assembly members about the substance and expected benefits of the Convention.225 In the face of
certain hesitations, the Arab League would better ensure ratification by maintaining involvement and support in this way in
all steps of the process.
221. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 12 (compliance); id. art. 3(2)
(defining the obligation to bring national policies and laws into alignment
with the obligations under the Convention).
222. Taylor, Lopas & Solomon, supra note 38, at 48; see also supra Part
II.A.3.
223. Khadija Elmadmad, An Arab Convention on Forced Migration: Desirability and Possibilities, 3 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 461, 462 (1991).
224. See, e.g., Taylor, Lopas & Solomon, supra note 38.
225. Id. at 48.
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The impact of the convention would hinge on states parties’
compliance, and in the face of a state party’s noncompliance, on
the Arab League’s ability to compel compliance via an oversight
function. The Arab League should therefore incorporate a
strong oversight function to avoid possible limits on its ability
to ensure compliance with an IDP convention. Critics have
voiced concern that the oversight function of the Kampala Convention may be weak.226 While the Arab League’s Council does
have monitoring functions and can issue binding judgments,
those decisions only bind the states that accept them.227 A provision that requires ratifying states to consent to being bound
by an oversight body might render this a non-issue. It is noteworthy that the oversight mechanism in the Kampala Convention 228 does not appear in previous African conventions; the
provision was negotiated for the first time at the AU summit at
which the Convention was adopted.229 This suggests that the
Arab League could incorporate a more strict oversight mechanism than that articulated in previous League documents and
in the Pact.
Finally, a right of intervention similar to that codified in the
Kampala Convention would likely be problematic for the Arab
League, steeped as the organization is in an emphasis on state
sovereignty. To cure the issue of vagueness, for which the AU’s
intervention power has been criticized, it would be beneficial
for the League to define the intervention right and to detail the
scope, procedures, and substance of that right. It also bears
keeping in mind that, while the intervention provision of the
Kampala Convention is based in the intervention right codified
in the AU’s Constitutive Act, the provision in the Convention is
seen to be an expansion of the authority as it appears in the
Constitutive Act.230 A similarly activist approach could be employed by the drafters of an Arab League IDP convention to
create an effective right of intervention on the part of the
League that has no precedent in prior League documents.
In light of these potential obstacles, the Arab League should
proactively seek to incorporate measures to strengthen the pos226. See, e.g., Giustiniani, supra note 46, at 370.
227. Romano & Brown, supra note 195.
228. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 14.
229. Abebe, supra note 38, at 52.
230. See Constitutive Act, supra note 105, art. 4(h); see also supra Part
II.B.1–2.
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sibility that such a convention would be drafted, widely supported, and subsequently abided. Following the lead of the AU
provides a solid starting point for such an approach.
C. The Prevalence of Internal Displacement and Regional Cooperation
Despite real ideological and practical hurdles that the Arab
League would face in the crafting of an instrument to address
internal displacement with a regional framework, the prevalence of internal displacement in the Arab League and the cooperation between member states, the U.N., and other regional
actors would work in the League’s favor and could bolster the
possibility of successfully developing such a document.
1. The Prevalence of Internal Displacement in the Arab Region
The degree to which internal displacement exists in Africa
was shown to have been of major importance to the AU’s ability
to create and encourage ratification of the Kampala Convention.231 This prevalence allowed the AU to couch the discussion
of displacement in terms of the phenomenon as an “African
problem” and the Convention as an African solution. However,
it is worth noting that the Convention was crafted amid a
downward trend in African displacement.232 While Africa continues to have the highest number of displaced persons, the
continent has seen the number of displaced drop since 2004.233
So while displacement has to a large degree been characterized
as an “African problem,” that characterization does not need to
become an excuse for this issue to not be taken up by other regions’ organizations.
Indeed, the Arab League could at this point adopt the issue of
internal displacement as an Arab regional problem. Throughout much of the twentieth century, many states in the region
experienced displacement due to ongoing wars and unrest.234
Indeed, most of the states in the League experienced phenome-

231.
232.
233.
234.

See supra Part II.C.
Global Overview, supra note 59, at 15.
Id.
Elmadmad, supra note 223, 462–65.
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na of displacement at some point toward the end of the twentieth century.235
And, unfortunately, the case could be made that internal displacement is becoming a twenty-first century “Arab region
problem.” In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the
number of IDPs tripled in the region due to multiple armed
conflicts.236 The Middle East and North Africa experienced the
highest percentage of increase in internal displacement of any
region in 2012, with the number rising more than 40% that
year and continuing to rise drastically throughout 2013.237 Indeed, the situation of internal displacement is more prevalent
now in the states of the Arab League than perhaps ever before.
As the historic visibility of displacement in Africa allowed the
AU to prioritize seeking a solution to the displacement problem, the Arab League should re-conceptualize the current displacement crisis as an Arab problem, requiring cooperative,
inclusive regional prioritization. Most states in the Arab region
have experienced displacement relatively recently, with the
last few years seeing an increase in displacement affecting the
entire region. The Arab region is therefore situated to use this
bleak situation as an opportunity to productively bind together
to find a common solution to this now-common problem.
2. Cooperation Between Arab States, the U.N., and Other Regional Actors
Cooperation between member states and with international
organizations and non-state actors was central to the approach
taken by the AU to successfully draft the Kampala Convention
and bring it into force.238 Unfortunately, the Arab League has
not benefited from a positive reputation for cooperation.239 The

235. Id. at 463–46 (highlighting the displacement experienced in Egypt,
Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria in the last decades of the twentieth century, making
the point that displacement has been a reality for many in the region).
236. Global Overview, supra note 59, at 72.
237. Internally Displaced Figures, UNHCR, supra note 7.
238. See supra Part II.B.2.
239. Indeed, the Arab League is widely considered to be riddled with shortcomings that severely inhibit proper functioning. Some even consider the
League an outright “failure.” See, e.g., Michael Barnett & Etel Solingen, Designed to Fail or Failure to Design? The Origins and Legacy of the Arab
League, in CRAFTING COOPERATION, supra note 83, at 180, 180–220.
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League is considered problematic and unique, elements that
may be characteristic of a region shaped by instability and a
lack of cohesion;240 the states that comprise the organization
are seen to have “deep-rooted ideological” differences.241 In contrast to newer regional organizations, the League has been
characterized as incapable or at least unwilling to work as a
force for change and cooperation in the region.242 It has been
argued that this is due in part to the League’s founding “principle of membership deriv[ing] from an ethnic nationalist identity—being Arab—rather than civic or geographic inclusion
within a region,”243 which has effectively prevented the League
from being a progressive, unifying influence.244
The Arab League’s reputation for a lack of cohesion among
members245 evokes concern that the League would be unable or
unwilling to serve as a driving force to lead and guide the drafting process, as the AU did in bringing the Kampala Convention
to fruition, and to subsequently ensure its effectiveness. Indeed, during its seventy-year existence, the Arab League has
proved consistently weak in steering the Arab region in any
particular collective direction. 246 Most relevantly, certain examples tend to indicate the League’s ineffective efforts to halt

240. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 207.
241. Id.
242. See Pinfari, supra note 39.
243. See Romano & Brown, supra note 195.
244. In this regard, the leadership of the League has been criticized in the
past for failing to take an active role in solving crises affecting the region.
This criticism was vividly portrayed in an article in the Lebanon Daily Star
in 2005, condemning the repeated inaction of the Arab League leaders, thus
“allowing crisis after crisis in the Arab world to go completely unaddressed . .
. . [T]ime after time, LAS has been guilty of extreme negligence and irresponsibility. Such inaction defies the notion of Arab cooperation, the ideal upon
which the Arab League was created.” Id. at 161.
245. As one scholar has noted, “The Arab League has mainly been a political bloc, albeit ineffective in presenting or generating a unified, integrated
Arab front.” Michael Fakhri, Images of the Arab World and Middle East: Debate about Development and Regional Integration, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 391,
399–400 (2010).
246. Brown, supra note 95, at 241–42. Brown provides one illustrative example: when Member State Iraq violated Pact provisions by invading fellow
Member State Kuwait, “[l]eague action was limited to condemning Iraqi aggression, demanding withdrawal, and reaffirming Kuwait’s sovereignty.” Id.
at 241.
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the Syrian uprising. In November 2011, for instance, the
League drafted a peace plan requiring the Syrian government
to cease hostilities.247 Syrian authorities accepted the plan, but
recommenced hostilities again the next day.248 In response, the
League “deployed observers . . . but their mission came to an
abrupt end when a month later the Gulf countries pulled their
members out,” citing the mission’s inability to bring “the perpetrators to account.” 249 The League’s response to this breach
may raise concerns about the League’s ability to effectively lead
the region toward signature and ratification of such an instrument and to subsequently compel compliance.
However, pertinent recent examples also demonstrate active
League involvement in seeking a solution to the Syrian conflict,
which suggests that the League may be growing into a new role
in the region.250 For example, the Arab League members have
voted to suspend Syria’s membership in the League for the
state’s violence toward civilians. 251 The suspension allegedly
resulted from delegates, “[a]larmed by the region-spanning upheaval of the Arab Spring demonstrations,” who sought “to
head off another factional war like Libya’s, in which the group
took the unprecedented step of approving international intervention.” 252 The League was commended for the decision, 253
with the action hailed as signaling a shift within the League:
In acting against Syria, a core member of the Arab League,
the group took [a] bold step beyond what had been a long tradition of avoiding controversy . . . Previously, when the Arab
League was more of a dictators’ club, cautious members . . .

247. See Syria: A Full-Scale Crisis, supra note 10, at 11.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. “In acting against Syria, a core member of the Arab League, the group
took [a] bold step beyond what had been a long tradition of avoiding controversy.” MacFarquhar, Arab League Votes to Suspend Syria over Crackdown,
supra note 25.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. President Obama issued a statement commending the League for the
decision to suspend: “After the Assad regime flagrantly failed to keep its
commitments, the Arab League has demonstrated leadership in its effort to
end the crisis and hold the Syrian government accountable.” Id.
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put the brakes on any activism. But the uprisings appear to
be rewriting that formula.254

Following the decision to suspend Syria, the Arab League
Chairman stated that the League’s goal was “to find a solution
to the problem within an Arab framework;” the suspension was
reportedly an attempt by the League “to walk a tightrope between bringing pressure to bear without bringing foreign military intervention.” 255 With such intent, the League reveals a
determination to act effectively as a cooperative body for the
good of the region, without relying on outside actors. Another
Arab League diplomat involved in the decision told the press
that the League did not want “some sort of a blank check that
is given to the Security Council to try to take this issue in hand
. . . [Rather, there is the belief that] if the regime comes under
intense pressure from the Arab side, then [the regime] will
make some changes.” 256 Accordingly, the decision by League
member states to suspend Syria showcases a more activist organization than it has traditionally proven to be.
Further, and most significantly here, the League couched the
decision to suspend as a regional response intended to bring
about a regional solution to halt a perceived regional harm.
This mirrors the approach taken by the AU in creating a convention to address displacement in Africa. Finally, the League
has demonstrated its ability for sustained engagement in
bringing about a solution to this regional harm. Indeed, the
League has been actively engaged in negotiating a political end
to the Syrian conflict and has been committed throughout to
ensuring that both sides of the conflict participate in the Geneva II peace talks.257
254. Id.
255. MacFarquhar, Arab League Votes to Suspend Syria over Crackdown,
supra note 25.
256. Id.
257.
Arab states formally endorsed proposed peace talks to end the Syrian civil war that have been delayed by disputes between world powers and divisions among the opposition. A final communique after an
emergency meeting of Arab League foreign ministers on Sunday
called on the opposition swiftly to form a delegation under the leadership of the mainstream Syrian National Coalition, to attend the
Geneva 2 talks. The Arab League’s position indicated Gulf rivals Qatar and Saudi Arabia—who have backed different rebel groups

398

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 39:1

These examples showcase willingness on the part of Arab
League member states to hold their regional neighbors accountable and to distance member states not acting in accordance with their norms. This is also an example of the regional
organization deciding to take action instead of waiting on international support. It has been suggested that this represents
a new stage in the League’s role in the region.258 That remains
to be seen. But, while it is still far from certain whether it
would be possible to create a regional convention to prevent internal displacement and to protect and assist IDPs in the Arab
region, these recent developments in the Arab League provide
at least some suggestion that the atmosphere within the
League may be well suited to consider the drafting of such a
regional framework with an inclusive and cooperative approach. Such a convention would go a long way toward reinforcing the emergence of a new Arab regional approach in which
member states view each other as cooperative partners sharing
similar experiences.
If the AU’s experience with the Kampala Convention is any
indication, the inclusion of legal experts and regional CSOs in
all stages of the process would prove critical to the Arab
League’s successful creation of a pragmatic IDP convention
well tailored to the region’s displacement concerns.259 The participation of independent legal experts would provide alternate
perspectives that may prove beneficial to the League in seeking
to overcome any obstacles that may be experienced due to the
fighting President Bashar Al Assad—had put their differences aside
to urge opposition chief Ahmad Jarba to head to Geneva . . . The Geneva talks are meant to bring Syria’s warring sides to the negotiating table . . . Syria’s Foreign Ministry reiterated on Sunday that it
must be up to Syrians alone “to choose their leadership and political
future without political interference.”
The Arab League, however, said only pressure from major powers could ensure a successful outcome in Geneva. In its communique it “reaffirmed the
Arab position that demands the necessity of the required international guarantees to supervise and ensure the success of a peaceful solution at the Geneva 2 conference.” Arab League Backs Geneva 2 Peace Talks, NATIONAL (Nov.
4, 2013), http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/arab-league-backsgeneva-2-peace-talks#ixzz2keDeSSrB; see also Arab League to Press Syria
Opposition over Peace Talks, supra note 40.
258. MacFarquhar, Arab League Votes to Suspend Syria over Crackdown,
supra note 25.
259. See supra Part II.B.2.
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League’s traditional emphasis on sovereignty; these experts
would be useful in the negotiation of substantive provisions,
such as whether the convention should incorporate a right of
League intervention, and if so, in what situations.260 The inclusion of CSOs and NGOs could ensure that the provisions respond to the needs of the region’s IDPs.261 Incorporating and
giving a voice to these non-state actors would also importantly
reveal that the League was taking a truly cooperative regional
approach to the issue of displacement.
The U.N.’s support of the Arab League in this endeavor
would also be highly beneficial. As demonstrated, the AU received significant support from the U.N. throughout the evolution of the Kampala Convention; that support has been noted
as crucial to achieving the end result.262 There is no indication
that the U.N. would not likewise support the Arab League in
undertaking a similar drafting and negotiation process. Indeed,
throughout the Syrian conflict, the U.N. has called attention to
the plight of Syrian IDPs and appealed to the relevant parties
to provide protection and assistance.263 The U.N. has also officially endorsed the Arab League’s efforts to cease conflict in
260. As discussed supra in Part II.B.3, the legal experts utilized by the AU
had a large influence on the substantive provisions and encouraged the incorporation of a right of AU intervention in grave circumstances; this provision clearly implicates territorial integrity and state sovereignty. The legal
experts that participated in the drafting of the Kampala Convention debated
this issue robustly. Id.
261. For instance, the on-the-ground nature of CSOs render these organizations well suited and well equipped to
monitor conditions of return, local integration or resettlement to another part of the country for IDPs; conduct inquiries into reports of
violations of IDPs’ human rights; investigate complaints particularly
regarding compensation or restitution for property, and discrimination against returnees; monitor and report on the implementation of
peace agreements with particular regard to their provisions for durable solutions; and advise the government on the rights of IDPs.
Ferris, supra note 177.
262. Abebe, supra note 38.
263. In a prominent example, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Human
Rights of IDPs in August 2012 “called upon all Syrian authorities and parties
to the conflict” to protect and assist IDPs, specifically urging the parties to
pay due “attention to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,” and
“remind[ing] parties to the conflict that IDPs are entitled to the rights and
freedoms afforded to them under international law irrespective of their legal
status.” Syria: Severe Internal Displacement Crisis, supra note 22.
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Syria and to provide assistance to the country’s civilians. 264
Additionally, the U.N. has been instrumental in serving as a
forum for the negotiation of a political solution to the conflict;
in September 2013, the Security Council unanimously called
for the Geneva II peace talks and various U.N. entities have
subsequently supported the work of relevant actors, including
the Arab League, in orchestrating that conference.265 This U.N.
involvement suggests that the Arab League would be able to
rely on this critical pillar of support as it pursued the creation
of a convention to address internal displacement in the Arab
region.
The above analysis suggests that, despite the Arab League’s
fundamental emphasis on sovereignty and a traditional lack of
intraregional cooperation, significant factors such as the current prevalence of displacement throughout the region and the
recent action taken by the Arab League indicate that it would
be possible at this time for the Arab League to draft an inclusive convention addressing the concerns of a variety of regional
actors and reflecting a shift toward regional cooperation and
accountability.
CONCLUSION
This Note has examined factors present during the formation
of the Kampala Convention and applied them to the context of
the Arab League to consider whether transferring a regional
approach beyond Africa could be a viable solution to internal
displacement crises in the Arab region. Some aspects of the Arab League make the creation and ratification of such a convention unlikely, such as the emphasis on sovereignty over regional unity and the characteristic disharmony between member
states. However, it was argued that the current prevalence of
the issue of displacement, the apparent cooperation of international institutions, and recent indications that the Arab League
may be taking a new, more robust leadership role in the region
264. This assistance has been provided since at least February 2012, when
the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution confirming its support of the
League’s efforts. G.A. Res. 66/253A, U.N. Doc A/RES/66/253A (Feb. 16, 2012).
See also Press Release, General Assembly, Top UN Human Rights Official
Says Member States ‘Must Act Now’ to Protect Syrian People, as Violent
Crackdown Continues, in Briefing to General Assembly, U.N. Press Release
GA/11206 (Feb. 13, 2012).
265. For information on this process, see supra note 25.
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counteract these factors. Therefore, the time is ripe for the development of such a convention.
To increase the chance of success (in the form of cooperation
during drafting, speedy and widespread ratification, and ultimate compliance with the provisions of such a convention),
drafters should include a provision that would create a regional
web of accountability between states, non-state actors, and the
Arab League itself, as appeared in the Kampala Convention.
The League should also replicate the AU’s inclusive negotiation
and drafting process, to encourage the input of the regional actors most in touch with the needs of IDPs. This inclusion would
also be good regional policy and may bolster the chance of compliance with the convention once implemented.
The perception that the Kampala Convention was a solution
to a uniquely African problem has been a powerful concept,
which carried weight with international organizations, nonstate actors, and member states alike. Accordingly, the actors
involved focused on the particular characteristics, trends, and
causes of displacement in Africa to arrive at a document tailored to the regional conditions of the phenomenon. Creating a
similar convention, the Arab League could seek to reconfigure
the issue of displacement as one that is also a problem experienced uniquely in the Arab region. Thus framed, intraregional
support for such a legal regime may be garnered and a convention that responds to the vernacular particularities of Arab internal displacement may develop.
The most likely obstacle to the creation of such a convention
by the Arab League may be the organization’s traditional focus
on sovereignty at the expense of intraregional cooperation.
However, recent activity of the League suggests that member
states are starting to hold each other accountable to regional
action and norms. In such a climate, delegates may well be
willing to consider a cooperative approach to displacement that
emphasizes regional accountability rather than individual
state sovereignty.
The AU has demonstrated that a regional approach to the
problem of internal displacement is possible. While it remains
to be seen how effective the Kampala Convention will be, the
Convention serves as a model for other regional organizations
to take the regional approach out of Africa and adapt it to fit
the vernacular conditions of displacement in other regions.
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Most immediately, the Arab League would do well to heed the
AU’s example.
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